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Letter to the White House on Lobbying Reform, February 3, 2010

February 3, 2010

Mr. Norm Eisen         
Special Counsel to the President
   for Ethics and Government Reform
White House Counsel’s Office
Executive Office of the President
Eisenhower Executive Office Building
1650 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20501

Dear Mr. Eisen,

There have been a variety of recent attempts to reform the policies which regulate government relations professionals (lobbyists) who attempt to influence the legislative and regulatory processes.  It is common knowledge that there is a strong association between political contributions made by lobbying organizations and the degree of access they obtain to elected and nonelected officials, and the amount of influence a lobbyist wields. 

Legislation and Executive Orders have been promulgated in recent times, in the wake of continued scandals and negative perceptions of government relations work, which seek to corral what many view as a corrupt system.  Most recently, President Obama issued Executive Orders designed to curtail the level of influence “special interests” have on officials in his Administration, and he announced a desire for more reform in the State of the Union Address.  Each of the efforts to reform government relations work, whether effective or not in their own right, have neglected a segment of lobbyists which are seldom discussed.  These are the lobbyists who are not associated with Political Action Committees (PACs), and do not make personal contributions to political candidates, and who are wholly incapable of the type of influence which these reform efforts seek to curtail.  Be that as it may, these reform efforts treat both types of lobbyists as one and the same.  Policies designed to eliminate the influence of dollars should also recognize this other class of lobbyist with specific exemptions.

Many lobbyists and lobbying organizations rely solely on the strength of their arguments when they discuss issues of national importance with members of Congress, administration officials and regulatory staff.  These groups include some trade associations, nonprofits, consultants and businesses.  These lobbyists approach government officials with an argument to advance or simply provide needed information specific to the interest group they represent that otherwise would not be known by the government official.  They embody what government reform efforts seem to consider the noble lobbyist; one who does not attempt to influence with political contributions, but relies solely on the strength of their argument or the information they provide.  Ironically, these lobbyists are seldom heard above the noise of true influence peddling.

Lobbyists without PAC money are already marginalized in the current system prior to having the opportunity to present information and arguments which are often profoundly important to a segment of the American people.  These lobbyists simply do not gain the access that lobbyists with well-funded PACs are able to muster.  New reforms which treat these lobbyists like any other “special interest” promise to yet again marginalize these professionals and their causes.  These current reforms are curtailing the ability of these lobbyists to state their cases.  This twice-over marginalization has exponential impacts on the voices of many Americans who will now be more unlikely than ever to be heard. 

A policy which recognizes the difference between lobbyists who can offer political contributions and lobbyists who rely on the force of their argument or information would be of great benefit to the political process and the American people. 

1.  The double marginalization of segments of the population would be lessened.
2.  Lobbyists who have insignificant PAC dollars may be encouraged to eliminate their PACs and instead focus on the strength of their arguments and information.
3.  A strong signal would be sent to the government relations community that reasoned arguments and information are paramount to political cash. 
4.  There would be an increased incentive to register as a lobbyist.  Registration as a lobbyist is based on often-subjective estimates of time and money.  Those who are border-line are currently motivated to avoid registration, and thus avoid the reform efforts sought by the Administration.  A policy that distinguishes between the two types of lobbyists would cause an increase in the number of registrants.

The Industrial Minerals Association – North America (IMA-NA) is a trade association created to advance the interests of North American companies that extract or process industrial minerals used throughout the manufacturing and agricultural industries.  IMA-NA, and its affiliated organizations, the National Industrial Sand Association and the International Diatomite Producers Association, staff a team of lobbyists which have decided to rely on reasoned argument and information as opposed to political donations in the presentation of the issues they represent.  IMA-NA requests that lobbying reform efforts do not ignore these noble efforts.

Sincerely,
Darrell K. Smith
Executive Vice President

cc:
The Honorable Robert I. Cusick, Director of the Office of Government Ethics
The Honorable Nancy Erickson, Secretary of the Senate
The Honorable Lorraine C. Miller, Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Peter Orszag, Director of the Office of Management and Budget